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1. Executive Summary. 
Kosovo has been a very difficult and 
slippery issue for the international com-
munity since the end of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO)* led military 
operation against the then Yugoslav armed 
forces in June 1999 1. The configuration of 
the architecture of the international pres-
ence in Kosovo, stemming from UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1244/1999, has 
 
 
* Full Professor of Public International Law, Scuola 
Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, Italy, deguttry@sssup.it 
1 For an interesting reconstruction of the events 
that led to the war, see N. MALCOLM, Kosovo: a Short 
History, London, 1998 and F. DE VRIEZE, Kosovo: Civil 
Society Awaits a Chance for Reconciliation, in P. VAN 
TONGEREN - H. VAN DEN VEEN - J. VERHIEVEN, Searching 
for Peace in Europe and Eurasia, Boulder (Colorado) 
2002, p. 289 a. 
proved to be quite effective in the field. 
Both the United Nations Mission in Kos-
ovo (UNMIK) and NATO’s Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) have been able to carry out their 
respective mandates in a not excessively 
controversial manner. However, it has left 
untouched the decisive issue of the future 
status of Kosovo. In recent years the Bal-
kan region has become a key priority for 
the European Union (EU) as the future of 
the Western Balkan countries lies firmly in 
their European outlook 2. The EU’s efforts 
in Kosovo build on the significant support 
it has been providing over the past years. 
At nearly 2 billion euros to date, the EU is 
already the largest donor to Kosovo. In 
the coming years (2007-2010), it will allo-
 
 
2 In this regard see also the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council Conclusion on Kosovo of 
February 18, 2008.  
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cate more resources to Kosovo per capita 
than to any other place in the world, nearly 
330 million euros 3. In recent months, after 
a long and fruitless round of negotiations 
about the future of Kosovo, the EU de-
cided to increase its role in this area 
through decisions to deploy the EULEX 
Kosovo mission and to appoint an EU 
Special Representative. Both these deci-
sions have raised serious criticism from 
various major international players with 
specific interests in that area. In recent 
times, concerns about the legality of the 
EULEX Mission and its relations with 
UNMIK also have been raised within the 
EU. According to press reports: 
 
Spanish Foreign Minister Angel Moratinos told 
a meeting of European Union Foreign Ministers 
in Slovenia over the weekend that Madrid will 
not send its contingent of 15-20 staff to the 
2,000-strong EULEX mission until there has 
been a formal transfer of powers from the 
United Nations 4. 
 
The main goal of this paper is to exam-
ine the legal basis of the European Un-
ion’s decision to launch the EULEX Kos-
ovo Mission from an international law 
perspective. If, from the point of view of 
the EU Treaty, the legal foundations of the 
Joint Action seem solidly based on articles 
14 and 25 of the Treaty on European Un-
ion, from an international law perspective, 
the question of the legality of EULEX’s 
deployment seems much more complex 
and disputable. The issues at stake are 
quite complex as they involve, among oth-
ers: the clarification of the Mission’s na-
ture; Kosovo’s legal status at the moment 
when the EU Joint action was adopted, 
and after Kosovo’s Declaration of inde-
 
 
3 See the European Union Background, The EU in 
Kosovo, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cmsUpload/080216THEEUINKOSOVO.pdf. Also 
see M. ALFONS, Of Standards and Status: the Role of 
the European Union in Kosovo from UNSC 1244 to 
the Future Status Talks, in Suedosteuropa, n. 3/2006, 
p. 339 ff. and G. SCORDINO, L’Unione europea ed il 
Kosovo, in Il Contesto, No. 5, 2006, p. 141 ss.  
4 The Minister was quoted by Balkan Insight, availa-
ble at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/9028/. 
pendence, the question of Kosovo’s recog-
nition by various EU member states, and its 
relationships with United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244/1999 and 
with the UN Mission in Kosovo and NATO-
led KFOR. 
2. A brief history of the international 
presence in Kosovo: UNSC Resolu-
tion 1244/1999 and the establish-
ment of UNMIK and KFOR. 
After a year of fighting within the prov-
ince, the failure of international efforts to 
resolve the conflict by diplomatic means 
and at the conclusion of the brief but 
dramatic tensions between a number of 
other states and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, accused of gross violations of 
basic human rights in Kosovo, NATO de-
cided to launch a military operation which 
lasted from 24 March to 2 June 1999. The 
war, the legality of which will not be ad-
dressed in this paper 5, was started, ac-
cording to NATO sources, as a “humani-
tarian intervention”. 
The military operations ended on June 
2, 1999, when the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia formally accepted the nine prin-
ciples set forth in a document presented in 
Belgrade on June 2 6. For the purposes of 
this paper, the relevant principles are 3, 4 
and 5. According to principle 3, there will 
be a deployment in Kosovo: 
 
under United Nations auspices, of effective in-
ternational civil and security presences, acting 
as may be decided under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achieve-
ment of common objectives. 
 
 
5 The question of the legality of the NATO inter-
vention in Kosovo is widely discussed in I. DAALDER, 
NATO, the UN and the Use of Force, in International 
Peacekeeping, January-April 1999, p. 27 ff.; N. RON-
ZITTI (ed.), Nato, conflitto in Kosovo e Costituzione 
Italiana, Milano, 2000 and E. SCISO (ed.), L’intervento 
in Kosovo: aspetti internazionalistici e interni, Milano, 
2001. 
6 The 9 principles are contained in annex 2 to the 
UNSC Resolution 1244/1999.  
6. 
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Principle 4 deals with the international 
security presence in Kosovo, while princi-
ple 5 states that an interim administration 
for Kosovo will be established: 
 
as a part of the international civil presence un-
der which the people of Kosovo can enjoy sub-
stantial autonomy within the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security 
Council of the United Nations. 
 
On June 10, 1999, the UNSC adopted 
Resolution 1244/1999 on the situation re-
lating to Kosovo: for the purposes of this 
paper, the most important part of the 
Resolution is paragraph 5, in which the 
Security Council: 
 
Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under 
United Nations auspices, of international civil 
and security presences, with appropriate equip-
ment and personnel as required. 
 
In order to implement this key deci-
sion, the Security Council 
 
Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the as-
sistance of relevant international organizations, 
to establish an international civil presence in 
order to provide an interim administration for 
Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can 
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide 
transitional administration while establishing 
and overseeing the development of provisional 
democratic self-governing institutions to en-
sure conditions for a peaceful and normal life 
for all inhabitants of Kosovo. 
 
As far as the length of these operations 
is concerned, the resolution’s phrasing is 
quite unusual. In almost all 7 previous cases 
of peace-keeping operations, a final date 
has always been set, with an indication 
that an extension was possible should the 
Security Council so decide. In this case, 
the Security Council decided that: 
the international civil and security presences 
 
 
7 In fact, there has been one other case (the UN 
peace-keeping operation deployed in 1960 in Congo) 
in which the absence of any temporal limit for the 
peace-keeping operation created numerous problems. 
On the basis of that experience, the UNSC decided in 
the future always to indicate a final date for the 
mission that could then be extended.  
are established for an initial period of 12 
months, to continue thereafter unless the Secu-
rity Council decides otherwise 8. 
 
In other words, a careful examination 
of the wording of this paragraph makes it 
clear that, after the initial period of twelve 
months, the two presences are authorized 
to remain indefinitely until the Security 
Council decides otherwise. Therefore, only 
the UN Security Council can decide the 
closure or the replacement of these opera-
tions. 
UNMIK and KFOR were deployed in 
June 1999 on the basis of the UNSC deci-
sion. The results achieved so far by the 
missions are described in the UNMIK 
2008 Factsheet 9, and in reports the UN 
Secretary General has delivered on a regu-
lar basis to the UN Security Council. 
The UN has described UNMIK as a 
typical peace-keeping operation. In fact, 
the basic principles and prerequisites for 
these types of operations have been fully 
respected 10. 
It is important to mention that the au-
thorities of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia agreed to the creation of both the 
security and the civil presences in Kosovo 
at the moment they accepted the princi-
ples presented to them on June 2, 1999 11. 
It should be underlined that acceptance of 
those principles by the national authorities 
of Yugoslavia was considered of pivotal im-
portance by the Security Council at the mo-
ment when Resolution 1244 was adopted 12. 
 
 
8 Para 19 of the UNSC Resolution 1244/1999. 
9 The Fact Sheet is available at http://www. 
unmikonline.org/docs/2008/Fact_Sheet_February_2008. 
pdf. See also W. PETRITSCH - R. PICHLER, Kosova, 
Der lange Weg zum Frieden, Klagenfurt, 2004 and D. 
ROSSBACHER, Friedenssicherung am Beispiel der Interims-
verwaltung der Vereinten Nationen im Kosovo (UNMIK) – 
Die Zivilverwaltung als neue Form der Friedenssicherung, 
Hamburg, 2004.  
10 See more in G. CELLAMARE, Le operazioni di 
peace-keeping multifunzionali, Turin, 1999; P. GAR-
GIULO, Le Peace Keeping Operations delle Nazioni 
Unite, Napoli, 2000.  
11 The document is available on http://www. 
unmikonline.org/doc/2008/Fact_sheet_February_2008_
pdf. 
12 In para 2 of the body of the Resolution, the 
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3. Towards a new phase in the politi-
cal process in Kosovo: from the 
“Guiding Principles” to Martti Ahti-
saari’s “Comprehensive proposal for 
Kosovo Status Settlement”. 
In May 2005, eight years after UNMIK’s 
deployment, having expressed his firm be-
lief that the time had come to move into 
the next phase of the political process in 
Kosovo, the Secretary-General appointed 
Ambassador Kai Eide his Special Envoy to 
carry out a comprehensive review of Kos-
ovo. This decision was endorsed by the 
Security Council on October 24, 2005 13. 
On October 31, 2005, with the full sup-
port of the UN Security Council 14, the 
Secretary-General appointed Mr. Martti 
Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, as 
his Special Envoy (SE) for the Kosovo fu-
ture status process. 
In November 2005, to support the 
Special Envoy in his efforts, the members 
of the Contact Group (France, Germany, 
Italy, Russian Federation, United King-
dom and United States) issued ten “Guid-
ing Principles” for a settlement of the status 
of Kosovo. Interestingly enough, principle 
1 restates that the settlement of the Kos-
ovo issue should be fully compatible with 
international law. Principle 10 is also ex-
tremely significant for the purposes of this 
paper, as it states that: 
 
For some time Kosovo will continue to need 
an international civilian and military presence 
to exercise appropriate supervision of compli-
ance of the provisions of the Status settlement, 
to ensure security and, in particular, protection 
for minorities as well as to monitor and sup-
port the authorities in the continued imple-
mentation of standards. 
 
At the end of intensive negotiations held 
over 14 months, during which 17 rounds 
of direct talks and 26 expert missions to 
 
 
Security Council formally welcomes the acceptance of 
the set of principles by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia. 
13 S/PRST/2005/51 of 24 October 2005. 
14 S/2005/709. 
Belgrade and Pristina were organized, Spe-
cial Envoy Ahtisaari concluded that poten-
tial for negotiations on Kosovo’s status 
was exhausted 15. On March 26, 2007, he 
presented his final proposals to the UN 
Security Council 16 entitled the “Report of 
the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General 
on Kosovo’s future status”. This report 
included a chapter devoted to the interna-
tional presence in Kosovo. After having 
reiterated that Kosovo would be responsi-
ble for managing its own affairs and for 
fulfilling its obligations under the settle-
ment, it was foreseen that an International 
Civilian Representative would be appointed 
to supervise the implementation of the set-
tlement and support the relevant efforts of 
Kosovo’s authorities and that KFOR would 
continue to be present throughout Kosovo 
and work in support of Kosovo’s authori-
ties. The content of this proposal deserves 
to be presented in a more detailed manner 
as the entire proposal was integrated into 
the new Constitution of Kosovo adopted 
by the Constitutional Commission on April 
2, 2008 17. 
 
The main aspects of Ahtisaari’s pro-
posal that concern the International Civil-
ian Representative can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
i) An International Civilian Represen-
tative (ICR), who will also be the EU Spe-
cial Representative (EUSR), will be ap-
pointed by an International Steering Group 
(ISG) comprised of key international stake-
holders. 
ii) The ICR will be the final authority 
in Kosovo regarding interpretation of the 
civilian aspects of the settlement. 
iii) The ICR will be supported by an 
International Civilian Office (ICO). The 
ICO will be smaller and its role will be 
substantially different than UNMIK. 
 
 
15 UNOSEK/PR/19, Saturday, March 10, 2007. 
16 S/2007/168. 
17 The text of the Constitution is available on http:// 
www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constituti
on.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.  
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iv) Unlike UNMIK, the ICR will not 
have an executive mandate to administer 
Kosovo. The ICR will have specific pow-
ers to allow him/her to take the actions 
necessary to oversee and ensure successful 
implementation of the settlement. The ICR 
may, for example, correct or annul deci-
sions by Kosovo public authorities that 
he/she determines to be inconsistent with 
the letter or spirit of the settlement. 
v) The mandate of the ICR will con-
tinue until the International Steering Group 
for Kosovo determines that Kosovo has 
implemented the terms of the settlement. 
The ISG will conduct its first review of the 
status of settlement implementation after 
two years. 
 
The Ahtisaari proposal also included 
the deployment of a European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) Mission with 
the following main characteristics: 
 
i) An ESDP Mission, under the direc-
tion of the EUSR, will assist Kosovo in the 
development of effective, fair and repre-
sentative rule of law institutions. 
ii) The ESDP Mission will have the au-
thority to ensure that specific sensitive cri-
mes are properly investigated, prosecuted, 
and adjudicated, including, where appro-
priate, by independent international pro-
secutors and judges. 
iii) The ESDP Mission will also have 
the authority to assume limited executive 
functions to ensure the maintenance and 
promotion of the rule of law, public order 
and security. 
 
Finally, in his proposal Ahtisaari devoted 
a few paragraphs to the International Mi-
litary Presence (IMP), which had the fol-
lowing main characteristics: 
 
i) KFOR will remain in Kosovo as the 
International Military Presence (IMP) to 
provide a safe and secure environment, in 
conjunction with the ICR and in support 
of Kosovo institutions until such time as 
those institutions are capable of assuming 
responsibility for Kosovo’s security. 
ii) At the beginning of settlement im-
plementation, KFOR will provide security 
to a number of pre-designated sites of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. 
iii) For an initial period, the IMP will 
also supervise, monitor and have executive 
authority over a new Kosovo Security 
Force. 
 
The Ahtisaari proposal has not, to date, 
ever been formally endorsed by the UN 
Security Council. 
4. The Council Joint Action 2008/124/ 
CFSP on the European Union Rule of 
Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kos-
ovo). 
After a long and complex internal ne-
gotiation, on February 4, 2008 the Council 
of the European Union finally adopted 
“Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on 
the European Union Rule of Law Mission 
in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo” 18. As a mat-
ter of fact the Council did prepare, already 
two years earlier, the ground for the 
deployment of EULEX adopting the Joint 
Action 2006/304/CFSP of 10 April 2006 
“On the establishment of an EU Planning 
Team (EUPT Kosovo) regarding a possible 
EU crisis management operation in the 
field of rule of law and possible other areas 
in Kosovo” 19. Interestingly enough, the de-
cision to deploy the EUPT was based on a 
specific request by the UN codified in a 
letter sent by the UN SRSG Jessen-Petersen 
to the EU SG/HR on 4 April 2006. In his 
letter the UN SRSG 
 
welcomed the EU’s engagement in the discus-
sions on the future international engagement 
in Kosovo and invited the EU to deploy an EU 
 
 
18 Official Journal of the European Union, L 42, 16 
February 2008. On this Joint Action see the com-
ments by G. VENNERI, The hour of Europe could come 
… Perspectives of the EU presence on Kosovo, in ISPI, 
Policy Brief, No. 77, March 2008. 
19 Official Journal of the European Union, L 112, 
26 April 2006. 
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Planning Team for Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) to 
Pristina 20. 
 
The main issue dealt with in the 2008 
Joint Action is the establishment of the 
EULEX Kosovo Mission, with a mandate 
to: 
 
... assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial au-
thorities and law enforcement agencies and their 
progress towards sustainability and account-
ability and in further developing and strength-
ening an independent multi-ethnic justice sys-
tem and multi-ethnic police and customs ser-
vice, ensuring that these institutions are free 
from political interference and adhering to in-
ternationally recognized standards and Euro-
pean best practices. 
 
More specifically, according to article 3 
of the Joint Action, EULEX Kosovo is 
expected to carry out the following tasks: 
 
a) monitor, mentor and advise the compe-
tent Kosovo institutions on all areas related to 
the wider rule of law (including a customs ser-
vice), whilst retaining certain executive respon-
sibilities; 
b) ensure the maintenance and promotion 
of the rule of law, public order and security in-
cluding, as necessary, in consultation with the 
relevant international civilian authorities in 
Kosovo, through reversing or annulling opera-
tional decisions taken by the competent Kos-
ovo authorities; 
c) help to ensure that all Kosovo rule of 
law services, including a customs service, are 
free from political interference; 
d) ensure that cases of war crimes, terror-
ism, organised crime, corruption, interethnic 
crimes, financial/economic crimes and other 
serious crimes are properly investigated, prose-
cuted, adjudicated and enforced, according to 
the applicable law, including, where appropri-
ate, by international investigators, prosecutors 
and judges jointly with Kosovo investigators, 
prosecutors and judges or independently, and 
by measures including, as appropriate, the crea-
tion of cooperation and coordination struc-
tures between police and prosecution authori-
ties; 
e) contribute to strengthening cooperation 
 
 
20 See paragraph 11 of the Preamble f the Joint 
Action 2006/304/CFSP. Italics added. 
and coordination throughout the whole judicial 
process, particularly in the area of organised 
crime; 
f) contribute to the fight against corrup-
tion, fraud and financial crime; 
g) contribute to the implementation of the 
Kosovo Anti-Corruption Strategy and Anti-
Corruption Action Plan; 
h) assume other responsibilities, independ-
ently or in support of the competent Kosovo 
authorities, to ensure the maintenance and pro-
motion of the rule of law, public order and se-
curity, in consultation with the relevant Coun-
cil agencies; and 
i) ensure that all its activities respect inter-
national standards concerning human rights 
and gender mainstreaming. 
 
According to article 2, paragraph 2 of 
the Joint Action, this mandate has to be 
fulfilled in full cooperation with the Euro-
pean Commission Assistance programmes 
through monitoring, mentoring and advis-
ing, while retaining certain executive re-
sponsibilities. 
Interestingly enough, article 5 (Launch-
ing and transition period) of the Joint Ac-
tion states that: 
 
1. The decision to launch EULEX Kosovo 
shall be taken by the Council upon approval of 
the OPLAN. The operational phase of EULEX 
Kosovo shall start upon transfer of authority 
from the United Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK 21. 
 
According to the Joint Action, EULEX 
Kosovo will, therefore, only assume its re-
sponsibilities after a build-up period of 
120 days after its launch. This means that 
UNMIK will remain fully in charge until 
the end of the transition period, when the 
EU will, possibly, step in to support the 
Kosovo authorities in their efforts to cre-
ate a sustainable rule of law system. 
Once it reaches full operational capa-
bility, the mission will have around 1900 
international police officers, judges, prose-
cutors and customs officials and approxi-
mately 1100 local staff. It will be based in 
headquarters in Pristina and located throu-
ghout the judicial and police system in 
 
 
21 Italics added. 
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Kosovo. A contingent of around 300 po-
lice and border officials is foreseen, but 
will only be deployed if deemed necessary. 
Yves de Kermabon (France) has been ap-
pointed Head of Mission 22. 
The initial mandate is for 2 years but 
the mission is expected to be terminated 
when the Kosovo authorities have gained 
enough experience to guarantee that all 
members of society benefit from the rule 
of law. The financial contribution neces-
sary to cover the expenditures for a period 
of sixteen months will be 205 million eu-
ros 23. 
5. The Council Joint Action 2008/123/ 
CFSP appointing a European Union 
Special Representative in Kosovo. 
On February 4, 2008, the same day in 
which the EULEX Kosovo mission was 
decided, the Council of the European Un-
ion adopted a Joint Action to appoint the 
EU Special Representative in Kosovo 24. As 
already mentioned in paragraph 3 of this 
paper, according to the Ahtisaari plan, an 
International Civilian Representative (ICR), 
who will also be the EU Special Represen-
 
 
22 Political and Security Committee Decision 
EULEX/1/2008 of 7 February 2008, in Official Journal 
of the European Union, L 42 of February 16, 2008.  
23 European Union. Fact sheet. EULEX Kosovo, Fe-
bruary 2008, available at http://www.consilium.europa. 
eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080216EULEXKOSOVO.pdf. 
24 Official Journal of the European Union, L 42 of 
February 16, 2008. On the role of the EUSR see G. 
GREVI, Pioneering foreign policy, The EU Special Re-
presentatives, Paris (Chaillot Paper No. 106), 2007. 
Too in this case the decision to appoint the EUSR has 
been preceded by Council Joint Action 2006/623/CFSP 
of 15 September 2006 «On the establishment of a 
EU-team to contribute to the preparations of the 
establishment of a possible international civilian mission 
in Kosovo, including a European Union Special Re-
presentative component (ICM/EUSR Preparation Team)»: 
see Official Journal of the European Union, L 253 of 
September 19, 2006. It seems worth underlying that 
too in this case the decision to deploy this EU-team 
was based on a specific request of the UN contained 
in a letter of August 11, 2006 from the UNSRSG to 
the EU SG/HR. 
tative (EUSR), must be appointed. He/she 
will be given be the final authority in Kos-
ovo regarding interpretation of the civilian 
aspects of the settlement. 
According to the Joint Action the 
EUSR’s mandate includes to: 
 
a) offer the EU’s advice and support in the 
political process; 
b) promote overall EU political coordina-
tion in Kosovo; 
c) provide local political guidance to the 
Head of the European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), in-
cluding on the political aspects of issues relat-
ing to executive responsibilities; 
d) ensure consistency and coherence of EU 
action towards the public. The EUSR spokes-
person shall be the main EU point of contact 
for Kosovo media on Common Foreign and 
Security Policy/ European Security and De-
fence Policy (CFSP/ESDP) issues. All press 
and public information activities will be con-
ducted in close and continued coordination 
with the SG/HR spokesperson/Council Secre-
tariat Press Office; 
e) until the expiry of Council Joint Action 
2006/623/CFSP of 15 September 2006 on the 
establishment of a EU team to contribute to 
the preparations of the establishment of a pos-
sible international civilian mission in Kosovo, 
including a European Union Special Represen-
tative component (ICM/EUSR Preparation 
Team), give political guidance and operational 
direction to the Head of the Preparation Team 
established thereby, preparing for the EU con-
tribution to an International Civilian Office; 
f) contribute to the development and con-
solidation of respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms in Kosovo, including with 
regard to women and children, in accordance 
with EU human rights policy and EU guidelines 
on Human Rights. 
 
Pieter Feith has been appointed Euro-
pean Union Special Representative (EUSR) 
in Kosovo. He will work in close coopera-
tion with the EU rule of law mission, 
EULEX KOSOVO and in this context, he 
will provide political guidance to the 
EULEX Head of the Mission, including 
on the political aspects of issues relating to 
executive responsibilities. According to 
the EU Council, it has to be expected that: 
 
the powers and authorities of the future Inter-
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national Civilian Representative will be vested 
in the same person as the EUSR 25. 
 
As a matter of fact, on February 28, 
2008, the first meeting of the International 
Steering Group for Kosovo was convened 
in Vienna, amid the protests of Serbia 26 
and Russia 27. In the presence of the fifteen 
self-invited States 28, the ISG was formed 
to «help guide Kosovo’s democratic de-
velopment in the years ahead». According 
to the statement released at the end of the 
meeting: 
 
Kosovo’s leaders have formally requested that 
we establish this body, which was envisioned 
in the Ahtissari Plan 29. 
 
During the same meeting the ISG ap-
pointed Peter Feith, already EU Special 
Representative in Kosovo, to be the Inter-
national Civilian Representative for Kos-
ovo and gave him the responsibilities and 
powers outlined in Annex IV of the Ahtis-
sari Plan. 
6. Defining the nature of EULEX Kos-
ovo Mission: a few preliminary con-
siderations. 
In several important documents, the 
EULEX Kosovo Mission has been defined 
 
 
25 European Union. Fact sheet. EUSR in Kosovo, Fe-
bruary 2008, available at http://www.consilium.europa. 
eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080216EUSRINKOSOVO.pdf. 
26 Kosovo Steering Group enrages Serbia, available at 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=45295&sectionid 
=351020606. 
27 Russia protests Kosovo Steering Group esta-
blishment available at http://en.rian.ru/world/20080303/ 
100494001.html.  
28 The following States are members of the Inter-
national Steering Group fro Kosovo: Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom and United States. 
29 The Press statement of the first meeting of the 
ISG is available at http://www.ico-kos.org/pdf/Presssta 
tement28feb.pdf. 
by the EU 30 as a EU crisis management 
mission. This is one of the typologies of 
EU field operations listed in the Treaty on 
European Union 31. 
In general terms, and making reference 
to a significant, although recent, practice 
within the EU, the main features of these 
kinds of missions, as opposed to other 
kinds of field operations, are very similar, 
if not identical, to those characterising 
traditional peace-keeping operations 32. 
They can be summarized as follows: 
peace treaty or ceasefire in place, request/ 
consent of the hosting State, impartiality 
of the field operation, and clear cut tem-
porary mandate aimed at consolidating 
the peace and assisting in the rebuilding of 
 
 
30 See, for example, the Council Joint Action 
2006/304/CSFP of April 10, 2006 «On the establish-
ment of an EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo) regard-
ing a possible EU crisis management operation in the 
field of rule of law and possible other areas in Kosovo», 
cit.  
31 According to art. 17 para 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union «Questions referred to in this Article 
shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeep-
ing tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis ma-
nagement, including peacemaking». Furthermore, ac-
cording to Art 27 para 3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, «The Council may authorise the Committee, 
for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis ma-
nagement operation, as determined by the Council, to 
take the relevant decisions concerning the political 
control and strategic direction of the operation, 
without prejudice to Article 47». See more on this in 
M. ORTEGA, Military Intervention and the European 
Union, Paris (Chaillot Paper No 45), 2001, N. RON-
ZITTI (ed.), Le Forze di Pace dell’Unione Europea, Ro-
me, 2005 and M. MERLINGE-R. OSTRAUSKAITE, European 
Union Peacebuilding and Policing: Governance and 
the European Security and Defence Policy, London, 
2006. 
32 On the relations between UN peace-keeping 
operations and similar operations carried out by re-
gional organisations or by a “coalition of the willing” 
see: H. Mc COUBREY-J. MORRIS, Regional Peacekeeping in 
the Post-Cold War Era, The Hague, 2000; U. VILLANI, 
Les rapports entre L’ONU et les organisations régionales 
dans le domain du maintien de la paix, in Recueil 
des cours de l’Académie de droit international de La 
Haye, 2001, tome 290, p. 299 ff.; R. DELLBRUCK, The 
Role of Regional Organisations in Maintaining Peace 
and Security, in M. BOTHE-M. O’CONNELL-N. RONZITTI 
(eds.), The Use of Force after the Cold War, Ardsley 
(NY), 2005, p. 145 ff. and A. SITKOWSKI, UN Peace-
keeping: Myth and Reality, London, 2006. 
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the country to achieve international stan-
dards. 
7. Critical reactions to the decision to 
deploy EULEX Kosovo. 
The EU’s decision to launch EULEX 
Kosovo has been fiercely opposed by a few 
members of the international community. 
In primis, for obvious reasons, are Serbia 
and the Russian Federation 33. On February 
14, 2008, the Serbian Government adopted 
a «Decision to annul the illegitimate acts of 
the provisional institutions of self-govern-
ment in Kosovo and Metohija on their dec-
laration of unilateral independence» 34, and 
requested the National Assembly to imme-
diately call a special session to confirm this 
government decision. 
This decision reiterates that “United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 
has explicitly stipulated that Kosovo and 
Metohija form an integral part of the Re-
public of Serbia” and “that this resolution 
has affirmed the commitment of all the 
states to its sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity”, and then states that all acts of the 
new Kosovar States are annulled and de-
clared not to have “any legal effect either 
in the Republic of Serbia or in the interna-
tional legal order” 35. 
Moreover, in article 6 of the decision, 
it is clearly stated that: 
 
Recalling the National Assembly Resolution on 
the Protection of Sovereignty, Territorial In-
tegrity and Constitutional Order of the Repub-
lic of Serbia and, in particular, point 5 thereof 
by which the National Assembly demands 
from the Government of Serbia to determine 
 
 
33 As a matter of fact China as well expressed 
“grave concern” abut the decision of Kosovo to pro-
claim unilaterally independence: see the statement of 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spoke-person of Fe-
bruary 17, 2008 available at http://www.china-un.org/ 
eng/fyrth/t408032.htm. 
34 The text of the Decision is available on: http: 
//www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.php?id=43154. 
35 Art. 1 of the Decision. 
with the EU that EU missions may not come to 
the territory of Serbia, to Kosovo and Metohija 
without an appropriate UN Security Council 
decision to that effect, the Government of Ser-
bia considers all the decisions of the EU bodies 
on sending a mission to Kosovo and Metohija to 
be invalid. Thus, these decisions produce no 
legal effect for Serbia nor any obligations for 
Serbia as regards their implementation 36. 
 
This position has been confirmed sev-
eral times by the Serbian authorities. In 
his statement at the Security Council 
meeting on March 11, 2008, called to dis-
cuss the situation in Kosovo, Vuk Jeremic, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia ex-
pressed his country’s point of view on two 
aspects which are relevant in this frame-
work. First of all, he addressed the ques-
tion of the relationship with the UN. In 
this regard he stressed that: 
 
Resolution 1244 (1999) must be observed in 
full. That is the only way to prevent a further 
deterioration of the situation on the ground. 
There must be no erosion of the clearly de-
fined mandate of the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
by the Security Council. Therefore, we strongly 
demand that no further transfer of competen-
cies from UNMIK to any other body take 
place. That is of vital importance 37. 
 
Secondly the Minister touched upon 
the question of the EU’s decision to de-
ploy EULEX Kosovo. He stated that: 
 
It is a great pity that some European countries 
have joined in that dubious exercise, first by 
recognizing the unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence by the authorities in Pristina, thereby 
gravely setting back the region’s European 
prospects, and then by establishing the Euro-
pean Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
(EULEX) and the affiliated International Steer-
ing Group (ISG) of countries. Both EULEX 
and the ISG have set for themselves the goal of 
assisting in the implementation of the Com-
prehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Set-
tlement – the so-called Ahtisaari proposal – 
but the Proposal has never been endorsed by 
 
 
36 Italics added. 
37 S/PV.5850, p. 3. 
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the Security Council, which is the only institu-
tion endowed with the power to legitimate 
changes in the nature of the international pres-
ence in Kosovo. It is therefore the basic position 
of the Republic of Serbia that both EULEX and 
the ISG operate well outside the parametres set 
forth by resolution 1244 (1999) and that their 
activities are strongly inconsistent with the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter and the 
Helsinki Final Act. Let me be clear: it is not 
that the European Union is unwelcome in our 
southern province – for we do welcome, as a 
matter of principle, any demonstration of 
Europe’s deepening commitment to our coun-
try, including Kosovo – but there has to be a 
clear legal mandate for any such commitment, 
and that can be achieved only by getting the ap-
proval of the Security Council. We must work 
together to overcome that problem within this 
very forum 38. 
 
Immediately after Kosovo’s proclama-
tion of independence, the Russian Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs also issued a state-
ment in which, after having denied the le-
gality of the Declaration of Independence, 
he expressed the hope that: 
 
… the UN Mission in Kosovo and NATO-led 
Kosovo Force will take immediate action to 
fulfill their mandates as authorized by the Se-
curity Council, including voiding the decisions 
of Pristina’s self-governing institutions and 
adopting severe administrative measures against 
them. Russia calls for the immediate convoca-
tion of an emergency UN Security Council 
meeting to examine the situation and take reso-
lute and effective measures for a return to the 
political settlement process in accordance with 
the provisions of UNSCR 1244 39. 
 
 
38 S/PV.5850 p. 4. Italics added. Almost identical 
arguments have been used by the President of the 
Republic of Serbia in his statement during a private 
meeting of the UN Security Council held on April 21, 
2008 and in the letter dated April 17, 2008 from the 
Permanent Representative of Serbia to the UN, Com-
ments on the Report of the UN Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, 
S/2008/287. 
39 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Fe-
deration, Information and Press Department, State-
ment by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kosovo 
of February 17, 2008, at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/ 
e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/041c5af4691
3d38ac32573f30027b380. 
Furthermore, in a statement delivered 
on February 20, 2008, the Russian Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Mikhail 
Kamynin, declared that: 
 
The decision to deploy an EU mission in Kos-
ovo likewise has no legal grounds. As is 
known, the preparations for deploying the EU 
mission were – and still are – being conducted 
in circumvention of the UN Security Council. 
In this context the mentions, in the conclu-
sions, of UNSCR 1244 look absurd. These EU 
actions do not conform to the principles of in-
teraction set forth in the Russia-EU roadmap 
for the common space of external security, 
primarily in the part of strengthening the cen-
tral role of the UN … The EU, by continuing 
to follow the unilateral scenario of solving the 
Kosovo problem, is acting to the detriment of 
stability in the Balkans and in Europe and en-
couraging separatism in the world 40. 
 
He then added: 
 
Russia remains firmly convinced that the prob-
lem of Kosovo’s status can and should be re-
solved in a reliable and long-term manner by 
way of the elaboration of, with the UN Secu-
rity Council in a leading role, a compromise 
solution. Russia’s constructive proposals on 
the options for continuing the status process 
have been presented in the UN Security Coun-
cil. Our initiative to jointly devise a roadmap 
which would take into account the interests of 
both parties, the priorities of key international 
stakeholders and chart the guidelines for mo-
vement by the parties towards an agreement in 
tandem with their Euro-integration perspective 
is still valid and relevant 41. 
 
The statement of the Permanent Rep-
resentative of the Russian Federation to 
the UN at the meeting of the SC devoted 
 
 
40 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federa-
tion, Information and Press Department, MFA Spo-
kesman Mikhail Kamynin Answers a Media Question 
on Kosovo on February 20, 2008, at http://www.mid. 
ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/f
bb3a3226cd8cef7c32573f500405651. 
41 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Fe-
deration, Information and Press Department, MFA 
Spokesman Mikhail Kamynin Answers a Media Que-
stion on Kosovo on February 20, 2008, at http://www. 
mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bc
bb3/fbb3a3226cd8cef7c32573f500405651.  
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to the Kosovo settlement was even more 
clear-cut. He stated that: 
 
The so-called European Union Rule of Law 
Mission (EULEX) has been launched without 
the necessary decision of the Security Council. 
The parameters of the EU Mission in Kosovo, 
above all from the viewpoint of the mandate 
given to it in Brussels, do not agree with the 
UNSCR 1244 provisions and the subsequent 
UNSC decisions on the functions and compo-
sition, including modalities on the “distribu-
tion of contributions” among UN partners, 
and most importantly on the mandate of the 
international civil presence in Kosovo. 
The UN Security Council has not authorized 
the launch of this operation. Nor can EULEX 
be part of the international civil presence as 
defined in UNSCR 1244, since according to 
Paragraph 1 of the Secretary-General’s report 
(S/1999/672) UNMIK covers all of the “space” 
allocated by this resolution to the international 
civil presence 42. 
 
At a press conference delivered at the 
end of a visit to Moscow by the UN Secre-
tary General, the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs of the Russian Federation took the 
opportunity to restate that his country re-
affirmed its position on the key role to be 
played by the UN Security Council for an 
acceptable solution of the Kosovo crisis 
and reiterated: 
 
the necessity to strictly fulfill the UN Mission 
in Kosovo mandate … I think that we have an 
understanding of the good prospects of further 
efforts in upholding just this kind of appro-
ach 43. 
 
To sum up, two are the main lines of 
criticism on the EU’s decision to deploy 
 
 
42 The statement of the Russian Permanent Re-
presentative is available at http://www.un.int/russia /new/ 
MainRoot/Statements/ga/ga_docs/Statement180208en.
htm. 
43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Fede-
ration, Information and Press Department, transcript 
of Remarks and Replies to Media Questions by Rus-
sian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Joint 
Press Conference After Meeting with UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon, Moscow, April 10, 2008, at 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/91DEB1C66CECC457C3
25742800389F93. 
EULEX Kosovo. One is related to the il-
legality of the Kosovo Declaration of In-
dependence of February 17, 2008, and the 
second is related to the incompatibility of 
the EU decision with UN Resolution 
1244. These arguments will be discussed 
in the following paragraphs. 
8. The Kosovo Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the new constitution and 
their impact on the issue of the le-
gality of the international presence 
in Kosovo. 
Just a few days after the adoption of 
the two EU Council Joint Actions, on Fe-
bruary 17, 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo 
adopted the Kosovo Declaration of Inde-
pendence 44 (the legality of which is be-
yond the scope of this study 45. As is well 
known, in this declaration it is stated that: 
We, the democratically-elected leaders of our 
people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an inde-
pendent and sovereign State. This Declaration 
reflects the will of our people and it is in full 
accordance with the recommendations of UN 
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Com-
prehensive proposal for the Kosovo Status Set-
tlement. 
 
The Declaration clearly indicates will-
ingness to: 
 
… accept fully the obligations for Kosovo con-
tained in the Ahtisaari Plan, and welcome the 
framework it proposes to guide Kosovo in the 
years ahead. We shall implement in full those 
obligations including through priority adop-
 
 
44 The Kosovo Declaration of Independence of 
February 17, 2008 is reproduced on the web site of 
the Assembly of Kosovo: www.assembly-kosova.org. 
45 On the Declaration of Independence see T. 
BRUHA, Mit ausreichendem Mandat? Rechtliche Grund-
lagen der internationale Praesenz im Kosovo heute und 
in Zukunft, in R. MUTZ-J. NARTEN-T. BRUHA, Zukunft 
des Kosovo, Hamburger Informationen zur Friedensfor-
schung und Sicherheitspolitik, n. 42/2007, Hamburg 
2007 and A. FERRARI, Il Kosovo indipendente, ISPI Po-
licy Brief n. 78, 2008.  
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tion of the legislation included in its Annex 
XII, particularly those that protect and pro-
mote the rights of communities and their mem-
bers. 
 
In paragraph 5 of the Declaration it is 
further underlined that the Assembly wel-
comes: 
 
the international community’s continued sup-
port of our democratic development through 
international presences established in Kosovo 
on the basis of UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 1244 (1999) 
 
and extends an invitation and a warm wel-
come to: 
 
an international civilian presence to supervise 
our implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, and 
a European Union-led rule of law mission. We 
also invite and welcome the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization to retain the leadership of 
the international military presence in Kosovo 
and to implement responsibilities assigned to it 
under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 
(1999) and the Ahtisaari Plan, until such time 
as Kosovo institutions are capable of assuming 
these responsibilities. 
 
Furthermore, the Kosovar authorities 
decided to give great emphasis to the Aht-
isaari Plan in their new Constitution. Arti-
cle 143 of the new Constitution adopted 
on April 9, 2008, clearly states that: 
 
Notwithstanding any provision of this Consti-
tution: 
1. All authorities in the Republic of Kosovo 
shall abide by all of the Republic of Kosovo’s 
obligations under the Comprehensive Proposal 
for the Kosovo Status Settlement dated 26 
March 2007. They shall take all necessary ac-
tions for their implementation. 
2. The provisions of the Comprehensive Pro-
posal for the Kosovo Status Settlement dated 
26 March 2007 shall take precedence over all 
other legal provisions in Kosovo. 
3. The Constitution, laws and other legal acts 
of the Republic of Kosovo shall be interpreted 
in compliance with the Comprehensive Pro-
posal for the Kosovo Status Settlement dated 
26 March 2007. If there are inconsistencies be-
tween the provisions of this Constitution, laws 
or other legal acts of the Republic of Kosovo 
and the provisions of the said Settlement, the 
latter shall prevail. 
 
There are two additional articles of the 
Kosovar Constitution worth mentioning in 
this framework. Both have been inserted 
in Chapter XIV, which is devoted to the 
transitional provisions. The first is article 
146 (International Civilian Representative), 
which reads as follows: 
 
Notwithstanding any provision of this Consti-
tution: 
1. The International Civilian Representative 
and other international organizations and ac-
tors mandated under the Comprehensive Pro-
posal for the Kosovo Status Settlement dated 
26 March 2007 have the mandate and powers 
set forth under the said Comprehensive Pro-
posal, including the legal capacity and privi-
leges and immunities set forth therein. 
2. All authorities in the Republic of Kosovo 
shall cooperate fully with the International 
Civilian Representative, other international 
organizations and actors mandated under 
the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement dated 26 March 2007 and 
shall, inter alia, give effect to their decisions 
or acts. 
 
The second important rule is found in 
article 147 (Final Authority of the Interna-
tional Civilian Representative), according 
to which: 
 
Notwithstanding any provision of this Consti-
tution: 
The International Civilian Representative shall, 
in accordance with the Comprehensive Pro-
posal for the Kosovo Status Settlement dated 
26 March 2007, be the final authority in Kos-
ovo regarding interpretation of the civilian as-
pects of the said Comprehensive Proposal. No 
Republic of Kosovo authority shall have juris-
diction to review, diminish or otherwise re-
strict the mandate, powers and obligations re-
ferred to in Article 146 and this Article. 
 
According to international sources, the 
draft Constitution of Kosovo had received 
a political blessing from the EU. Peter 
Feith, the EU Special Representative, has 
been quoted as saying that the draft was in 
line with the international standards to 
which Pristina committed itself when de-
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claring independence from Serbia on Feb-
ruary 17, 2008 46. 
9. The legal basis of the EULEX Kosovo 
Mission according to the Council Joint 
Action 2008/124/CFSP: a critical over-
view. 
Both EU Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP 
and the Kosovo Declaration of Independ-
ence repeatedly make reference to UN Se-
curity Council Resolution 1244/1999. The 
aim of this paragraph is to analyse the con-
tents of that Resolution in order to ascer-
tain whether, under international law, it 
can constitute the legal basis for the estab-
lishment and deployment of the EULEX 
Mission. 
If, from the point of view of the Treaty 
on the European Union, the legal founda-
tion of the Council Joint Action seems sol-
idly based on both Articles 14 47 and 25 48 
(third paragraph) of the Treaty itself, from 
an international law perspective the ques-
tion of the legal foundation of the de-
ployment of the EULEX Kosovo raises 
many more doubts and definitively seems 
more problematic. 
Compared to other similar decisions or 
Joint Actions, the one examined in this 
paper is not very generous in giving ex-
plicit details about the decision’s legal ba-
sis according to international law. While 
abundant reference is made in the Council 
 
 
46 GOLDIROVA, Kosovo Constitution Approved by 
EU, in EUOBSERVER.com, April 3, 2008 (at htpp://www. 
euobserver.com/9/25912?rss_rk=1.  
47 Art. 14 of the Treaty on European Union states 
that «The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint 
actions shall address specific situations where opera-
tional action by the Union is deemed to be required. 
They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means 
to be made available to the Union, if necessary their 
duration, and the conditions for their implementation». 
48 Art. 25, para 3 states that «The Council may 
authorise the Committee, for the purpose and for the 
duration of a crisis management operation, as deter-
mined by the Council, to take the relevant decisions 
concerning the political control and strategic direction 
of the operation, without prejudice to Article 47». 
Joint Action to the legal basis within the 
EU framework, the references to the legal 
basis in international law are drafted in 
quite an ambiguous manner. Before enter-
ing into the details of the precise wording 
of this Joint Action, it might be opportune 
to restate that previous Council Joint Ac-
tions devoted to the establishment of EU 
crisis management operations have been 
based alternatively on the consent of the 
hosting state: 
 
a) and a UN enabling resolution (as an 
example we might cite the Council Joint 
Action 2007/405/CFSP 49 on the EU Po-
lice mission EUPOL RD Congo); 
b) and a UNSC Resolution welcoming 
the EU’s decision to deploy a field opera-
tion (Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP 50 
of March 11, 2002 on the European Union 
Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP 51 on 
the European Union Military Operation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Council Joint 
Action 2007/369/CFSP 52 of May 30, 2007 
on establishment of the European Union 
Police Mission in Afghanistan); 
c) clearly spelled out (Council Joint 
Action 2005/190/CFSP 53 of March 7, 2005 
on the European Union Integrated Rule of 
Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX, 
Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP 54 of 
November 14, 2005 on the European Union 
Police Mission for the Palestinian Territo-
ries, Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP 55 
of December 12, 2005 on Establishing a 
European Union Border Assistance Mis-
 
 
49 Official Journal of the European Union, L 151 of 
June 13, 2007. 
50 Official Journal of the European Union, L 70 of 
March 13, 2002. 
51 Official Journal of the European Union, L 252 of 
July 28, 2004. 
52 Official Journal of the European Union, L 139 of 
May 1, 2007. 
53 Official Journal of the European Union, L 62 of 
March 9, 2005. 
54 Official Journal of the European Union, L 300 of 
November 17, 2005. 
55 Official Journal of the European Union, L 327 of 
December 14, 2005. 
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sion for the Rafah Crossing Point, EU 
BAM Rafah). 
 
In an international law perspective, for 
the first time in the history of similar do-
cuments, in Council Joint Action 2008/124/ 
CFSP, dealing with the establishment of 
EULEX Kosovo, reference to the legal ba-
sis has been addressed in an entirely dif-
ferent manner. 
The first element to be noted is the total 
absence of any reference to the consent of 
the hosting State to the deployment of the 
mission. For the first time, the Council of 
the European Union decided to establish a 
crisis management operation without the 
prior approval of the state on whose terri-
tory the mission will be deployed. 
Although the reasons behind this situa-
tion are self-evident and do not need any 
additional explanation, it must be under-
lined that the lack of any agreement/invi-
tation by the hosting state, which, as we 
have seen before, has always represented 
one of the fundamental pillars and pre-
requisites for a peace-keeping operation, 
could have a significant impact on the very 
nature of the operation. 
As a matter of fact, it also should be 
mentioned that a new trend has emerged in 
UNSC practice, especially in two recent cases 
concerning Sudan and Somalia, in which 
the decision to launch a peace-keeping op-
eration was taken notwithstanding the fact 
that the hosting states did not in any way 
express their consent. In those cases, how-
ever, the actual implementation and deploy-
ment of the mission in the field occurred 
only after additional negotiations with the 
hosting states, at the end of which the states 
gave a green light to the troop deployment. 
That said, it remains to be ascertained 
whether, having been unable to base the 
legality of the mission on the consent of 
the hosting state, the EU can base its deci-
sion on an enabling UNSC resolution. An 
attempt in this direction was made in the 
phrasing of the preamble of the Joint Ac-
tion and in a few (unfortunately rare) sta-
tements by EU authorities 56. 
 
 
56 See, for example, the statement delivered at a 
In the preamble of the Council Joint 
Action several references and quotations 
are devoted to UNSC Resolution 1244 of 
June 10, 1999, which authorized the estab-
lishment of an international civil presence 
as well as an international security pres-
ence in Kosovo. After careful examination 
in an international law perspective, these 
references all seem totally inappropriate 
and inadequate as legal bases for EULEX 
Kosovo. In paragraph 10, the UNSC Reso-
lution clearly stipulates that the interna-
tional civil presence has to be established 
by the Secretary General with the assis-
tance of the relevant international organi-
sations. In the case we are examining in 
this paper, it is evident that the UN Se-
cretary General, although repeatedly wel-
coming EU cooperation in helping to 
solve the crisis in Kosovo and its contribu-
tion to the stability of the region, has ne-
ver formally endorsed the establishment of 
EULEX Kosovo. 
In this situation, it should be recalled 
how, in a very similar situation in 1999, 
the EU decided to contribute to the inter-
national civil presence in Kosovo, taking 
the responsibility to lead the “Reconstruc-
tion pillar” within UNMIK. A Council Joint 
Action was adopted on July 29, 1999, 
“Concerning the installation of the struc-
tures of the United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK)” 57. In the preamble of 
that Joint Action it was clearly spelled out 
that the EU’s decision to contribute to the 
international civil presence in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) was based on a request by the 
then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 58. 
 
 
press conference in Brussels by the President of the 
European Commission on February 21, 2008 in which 
the issue of the legality of the mission was touched upon. 
Extracts of the statement are available at http://www. 
b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm 
=02&dd=23&nav_id=47920. 
57 Official Journal of the European Communities, L 
201 of July 31, 1999. 
58 This request from the UN Secretary General to 
the EU to support the “Reconstruction pillar” in 
UNMIK is confirmed as well in the Report of the 
Secretary General to the UN Security Council pur-
suant to Paragraph 10 of the SC Resolution 1244 
(1999): S/1999/672 of June 12, 1999.  
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The EU took the decision to take part in 
UNMIK whereas: 
 
The United Nations Secretary General wished 
to entrust the task of economic reconstruction, 
rehabilitation and development of Kosovo to 
the European Union. 
 
Moreover, in the same Joint Action of the 
Council the European Union clearly states 
that: 
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 establishes the 
principle of organisation of the civil admini-
stration in Kosovo (UNMIK) headed by a Spe-
cial Representative of the United Nations Sec-
retary General. 
 
This paragraph leaves no doubt about 
how, at that moment, the EU interpreted 
UNSC Resolution 1244, and more specifi-
cally, paragraph 10: the international civil 
presence in Kosovo was organised under 
the authority of the UN Secretary Gen-
eral. 
To further consolidate this view it is 
important to recall that on July 17, 2007, 
several EU Member States 59 together with 
the USA presented to the Security Council 
a draft resolution on Kosovo 60 in which 
the sponsors, having stated that “the unre-
solved situation in Kosovo continues to 
constitute a threat to international peace 
and security”, confirmed the “primary re-
sponsibility of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international pace and se-
curity”. The main goal of the draft Resolu-
tion can be easily found in its paragraph 7 
in which the SC 
 
Authorizes the establishment of a European 
Union ESDP Mission and decides that the 
Mission shall have powers and authorities set 
forth in Annex I of this Resolution after the 
 
 
59 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, United Kindgom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
60 S/2007/437 of July 17, 2007. This draft pro-
posal has been the fifth attempt to bring to the UNSC 
a Resolution on the future status of Kosovo: all of 
them failed. 
end of the transition period referred to in 
paragraph 5 61. 
 
Paragraph 5 is extremely relevant too as 
the Security Council was requested to for-
mally decide that 
 
The mandate of the international civil presence 
shall terminate at the end of a 120- day transi-
tion period following the adoption of this reso-
lution and that the existing international civil 
presence shall implement with the ICR and 
ESDPO during this period all appropriate ar-
rangements for the details and modalities of 
the transition. 
 
Although this draft resolution has ne-
ver been approved by the Security Council, 
it reinforces the theory that a UN Security 
Council resolution would have been of 
essential importance for a proper and 
sound regulation of the relations between 
UNMIK and EULEX Kosovo. 
Furthermore it is important to recall 
that the 2006 Council Joint Action “On 
the establishment of an EU Planning Team 
(EUPT Kosovo) regarding a possible EU 
crisis management operation in the field of 
rule of law and possible other areas in 
Kosovo”, which has already been quoted, 
clearly states that the decision do deploy 
the EUPT is based on an formal invitation 
from the UN 62. 
Finally, in paragraph 3 of the preamble 
of the Council Joint Action there is a ref-
erence to another UNSC resolution, which 
could be read as an additional attempt to 
legitimize the deployment of the mission 
in Kosovo. Paragraph 3 states that: 
 
There is a need to prevent, on humanitarian 
grounds, possible outbreaks of violence, acts of 
persecution and intimidation in Kosovo, taking 
 
 
61 It has to be noticed that in this case the States 
which were sponsoring the Resolution requested the 
UNSC to “authorize” (and not simply to “endorse” 
politically or to “welcome”) the deployment of the 
ESDP Mission: as already clarified, in those circums-
tances (as at that moment the Kosovo State did not 
yet exist) the deployment of an ESDP mission without 
the prior authorization of the UNSC would have been 
definitively of dubious legality. 
62 See previous footnote 20.  
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into account, as appropriate, the responsibility 
towards populations as referred in Resolution 
1674 by the United Nations Security Council 
on 28 April 2006. 
 
The UNSC resolution mentioned is 
Resolution 1674, “Protection of civilians 
in armed conflict”. This Resolution, which 
constitutes an updated version of previous 
UNSC Resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 
(2000), has had a very high profile impact 
on the issue of protection of civilians dur-
ing armed conflicts. However, it does not 
mention at all any kind of authorization, 
de jure or even de facto, nor any specific 
right of any state or regional organization 
to intervene to stop or “to prevent, on 
humanitarian grounds, possible outbreaks 
of violence, acts of persecution and in-
timidation in Kosovo”. This conclusion is 
reinforced by a legal analysis of UN Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 60/1 (2005) 
World Summit Outcome, in which, after 
having reiterated that each individual state 
has the responsibility to protect its popu-
lations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity, and 
that the international community, through 
the United Nations, also has the response-
bility to use appropriate means to help to 
protect populations in danger of suffering 
these kind of violations, clearly states: 
 
in this context, we are prepared to take collec-
tive action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council 63, on a case-by-
case basis and in cooperation with relevant re-
gional organisations, as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national 
authorities are manifestly failing to protect 
their populations … 
 
In the case we are examining, there has 
been no specific UNSC decision authoriz-
ing the EU to deploy the mission in Kos-
ovo nor has there been an official and 
formal invitation by the UN Secretary 
General to deploy EULEX Kosovo. 
To sum up, it appears evident that, dif-
fering from previous cases, in the Council 
 
 
63 Italics added. 
Joint Action dealing with Kosovo there is 
no clear and convincing indication of the 
grounds on which the decision to establish 
EULEX Kosovo is based according to in-
ternational law. 
The silence of the Joint Action on this 
specific aspect and given that, in this case, 
the legality of the mission is not based on 
a UNSC resolution or the consent of the 
hosting State (Serbia), makes the impor-
tance of the mission’s legal basis in inter-
national law more evident. In the follow-
ing paragraph we will try to address this 
issue. 
10. The legal basis of EULEX Kosovo: a 
different line of reasoning. 
Given what we have seen, it appears 
that the traditional arguments used in si-
milar cases to establish legality of missions 
cannot be used. Therefore, additional ef-
forts have to be made to find a solution 
concerning the mission’s legality in an in-
ternational law perspective. 
As a preliminary consideration, it should 
be pointed out that, so far, the EULEX 
Mission has not yet been officially de-
ployed in the field. As already mentioned, 
according to article 5 of Joint Action 
2008/124/CFSP: 
 
the operation phase of EULEX Kosovo shall 
start upon transfer of authority from the Uni-
ted Nations Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK 64. 
 
That said, decisive elements which have 
 
 
64 As a matter of fact, the EU has already officially 
dispatched the EU Planning Team to Kosovo: see 
more at previous para 4. They were given the man-
date to support the Kosovo authorities by monitoring, 
mentoring and advising on all areas related to the rule 
of law, in particular in the police, judiciary, customs 
and correctional services and to ensure, in close 
cooperation with the Kosovo authorities, that serious 
crimes are properly investigated, prosecuted and that 
any outcome of these procedures are thereafter pro-
perly enforced. De facto, the first wave of interna-
tional personnel of EULEX already arrived in the 
country in April 2008. 
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to be taken into consideration are the 
Declaration of Independence adopted by 
the Assembly of Kosovo on February 17, 
2008 and the subsequent recognition of 
the new State of Kosovo by several sta-
tes 65. In my opinion, after February 17, 
2008, the legal basis of the deployment of 
the EULEX Kosovo mission can be based 
on the ex-post endorsement of its de-
ployment contained in the Kosovo Decla-
ration of Independence and, later, in the 
new Constitution of the Republic of Kos-
ovo. As has been pointed out already, in 
paragraph 5 of the Declaration the As-
sembly welcomes: 
 
the international community’s continued sup-
port of our democratic development through 
international presences established in Kosovo 





we invite and welcome an international civilian 
presence to supervise our implementation of the 
Ahtisaari Plan, and a European Union-led rule 
of law mission. We also invite and welcome the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization to retain the 
leadership of the international military presence 
in Kosovo and to implement responsibilities as-
signed to it under UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 1244(1999) and the Ahtisaari Plan, until 
such time as Kosovo institutions are capable of 
assuming these responsibilities. 
 
Therefore, the state has given its au-
thorization for the deployment of EULEX 
Kosovo and any doubt about its legality 
should be resolved thanks to the subse-
quent confirmation by the hosting state, 
which arrived, in any case, prior to the ef-
fective deployment of the field operation. 
Similar conclusions were reached in a 
previous case concerning Sudan when the 
UN Security Council, through Resolution 
1706/2006, decided to expand the man-
date of the United Nations Mission in Su-
dan (UNMIS) and to significantly increase 
its strength without having received any 
 
 
65 As of April 4, 2008, 36 states, including 19 
member states of the European Union formally reco-
gnized the independence of the Republic of Kosovo.  
prior consent from the Sudanese Gov-
ernment, which, on the contrary, fiercely 
opposed the adoption of the Resolution. 
In that case, as in the one examined here, 
the actual deployment took place much 
later and only after formal and de facto 
agreement was given by the competent 
Sudanese authorities. 
In the Kosovo case, however, this con-
clusion is not without its consequences. It 
implies that Kosovo is recognized as a state 
with all rights and responsibilities. It also 
carries with it de facto recognition 66 of the 
new state by those EU member states who 
formally have not yet recognized it but de-
cide to take part to EULEX Kosovo. (As 
of April 4, 2008, 19 EU member states 
have formally recognized the new entity). 
In any case, it is worth underlining that 
by applying this line of reasoning it is only 
possible to solve the problem of the legal-
ity of the EU deployment in Kosovo. The 
issue of relations between EULEX Kos-
ovo and UNMIK remains an open one. 
The following paragraph will be devoted 
to this specific aspect, which, because of 
its legal and political implications, contin-
ues to be extremely sensitive. 
11. UNMIK and EULEX Kosovo: competi-
tion, cooperation and labour shar-
ing, replacement or (geographical) 
specialization? 
After the launch of EULEX Kosovo 
and the appointment of the EU Special 
Representative, the institutional architec-
ture of the international presences in Kos-
ovo, both civil and security, presents uni-
que features which, if not addressed prop-




66 It is interesting and relevant to underline, at this 
regard, that Romania’s Foreign Minister stated that the 
participation of the country’s policemen and Gendar-
merie in EULEX does not mean “that Bucharest de 
facto acknowledged the unilaterally proclaimed inde-
pendence of Kosovo”: the statement is available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Policy/CI/KIM/210208_html.  
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The central and most delicate issue is 
shaping the future relations between 
EULEX Kosovo and UNMIK. The main 
problem is that UNMIK, established by 
the UNSC in Resolution 1244/1999 and 
then implemented by the UN Secretary 
General according to paragraph 10 of the 
above-mentioned Resolution, has no time 
limit attached. This means that UNMIK 
will remain active in Kosovo until a new 
UNSC Resolution decides otherwise. This 
is also NATO’s official position. In a 
statement by the North Atlantic Council 
after Kosovo’s declaration of independ-
ence, NATO reaffirms that: 
 
KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of 
UNSCR 1244, as agreed by Foreign Ministers 
in December 2007, unless the UN Security 
Council decides otherwise 67. 
 
The Secretary General of the UN re-
cently also fully endorsed this position. 
During a statement released at a press con-
ference in Moscow on February 17, 2008, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated of-
ficially that: 
 
the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) will con-
tinue to exercise its authority in the area unless 
the Security Council decides otherwise 68. 
 
Alternatively, according to paragraph 
10 of Resolution 1244, the UN Secretary 
General can at any moment formally en-
dorse the deployment of a new interna-
tional civil presence in Kosovo to rein-
force the activities of UNMIK. Paragraph 
5 of the UNSC Resolution makes it very 
clear that the deployment in Kosovo of an 
international civil presence has to occur 
“under United Nations auspices”. 
As mentioned earlier, the phrasing of 
this specific part of the Resolution sounds 
very similar to that used in UNSC Resolu-
tion 143/1960, devoted to the Congo 
question, in which the Security Council 
 
 
67 The Statement of February 18, 2008 is available 
at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-025e.html. 
68 The press statement is available at http://www. 
unmikonline.org/news.htm#0704.  
decided, without any temporal limit, to: 
 
authorize the Secretary General to take the 
necessary steps, in consultation with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of the Congo, to pro-
vide the Government with such military assis-
tance as may be necessary until, through the 
efforts of the Congolese Government with the 
technical assistance of the United Nations, the 
national security forces may be able, in the 
opinion of the Government, to meet fully their 
tasks. 
 
In that case as well, the UNSC did not 
fix any final date for the mission’s de-
ployment in the field. This contributed to 
the creation of a very difficult situation 
and a lot of embarrassment for then Secre-
tary General Dag Hammarskjold as, due 
to profound disagreement among the 
members, both the Security Council and 
the General Assembly were unable to give 
any appropriate instructions to the Secre-
tary General on what to do in the chang-
ing environment in Congo 69. From that 
case on, the UN Security Council has al-
ways authorized deployment of field op-
erations with temporal limits, which could 
then be extended by the Council itself. 
The Kosovo case and Resolution 1244 
represent, therefore, a clear exception and 
derogation from a consolidated practice 
which will most probably create additional 
difficulties, both in political and in legal 
terms, that could have a negative impact 
on the work carried out by the interna-
tional presence in Kosovo and in the end, 
affect the human security of Kosovars. 
 
Several scenarios are possible. The first 
is cooperation and labour sharing. Given 
the position expressed by Russia and other 
members of the Security Council who op-
posed the unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence proclaimed by the Kosovar au-
thorities and the subsequent recognition 
 
 
69 For a detailed description of those event please 
see D. BOWETT, UN Forces, London, 1964, p. 157-
165 and J. SOUBEYROL, Aspects de la function inter-
pretative du Secrétaire general de l’ONU lors du l’af-
faire du Congo, in Revue Générale de Droit Internatio-
nal Public, 1966, p. 565 ff.  
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of the new State by several members of 
the international community, it can be ex-
pected that Russia will use its veto-power 
to block any new UNSC Resolution aimed 
at terminating UNMIK’s mandate and, in 
the meantime, pressure the UN Secretary 
General not to endorse any new field op-
eration in Kosovo. Should this happen, it 
seems obvious that UNMIK and EULEX 
might have to live together for a certain 
period and adjust their operational de-
ployment to deal with the developments 
and changes on the ground. This would 
imply that both UNMIK and EULEX 
Kosovo would have to readjust their ac-
tivities, as many of EULEX Kosovo’s tasks 
are identical, or at least very similar, to 
those assigned to UNMIK by UNSC Reso-
lution 1244.  
Ideally, a formal or even de facto 
agreement between UNMIK and EULEX 
Kosovo on how to share the different tasks 
would very much help to improve the qual-
ity and the effectiveness of cooperation and 
avoid misunderstandings that could create 
dangerous tensions. This might happen 
unly if the UN Secretary General will for-
mally endorse the deployment of EULEX 
Kosovo, according to the power conferred 
on him by paragraph 10 of Resolution 1244. 
As an alternative, under pressure not 
to formally endorse any EU field opera-
tion, it might well be possible that the UN 
Secretary General could simply take note 
of the EU’s decision and not oppose it 
(“the silent nod”). Considering that Reso-
lution 1244 is not explicit on how the UN 
Secretary General has to involve the rele-
vant international organizations in estab-
lishing the international presence, he 
could take a very active approach, as in the 
initial phase of UNMIK’s establishment, 
when he continuously sought support from 
international institutions to carry out his 
mandate in Kosovo, or a more passive ap-
proach. In the latter case, the Secretary 
General simply could take note of the of-
fers of cooperation presented by the inter-
ested international institutions and ex-
pressly or de facto accept or reject them. 
This would seem to be the UN Secretary 
General’s most recent approach. In his 
closing remarks at the UNSC meeting de-
voted to Kosovo on February 18, 2008, he 
expressed his opinion in the following 
manner: 
 
As I have stated, the Secretariat continues to 
operate in Kosovo on the understanding that 
resolution 1244 (1999) remains in force, unless 
the Council decides otherwise. I expect every-
one in Kosovo to act in a manner consistent 
with the operational framework for the inter-
national civil presence established in accor-
dance with resolution 1244. As I noted earlier, 
I have taken note of the European Union’s deci-
sion to deploy a rule of law mission and an EU 
Special Representative. I would consider that an 
enhanced role of the EU in Kosovo would be 
assessed in the context of the overall concept of 
operations of UNMIK, the objectives of the UN 
in Kosovo and the objectives of protecting the 
UN legacy in Kosovo and the Balkans 70. 
 
This also seems to be the European 
Commission’s line of reasoning. In a joint 
press conference with British Prime Min-
ister Gordon Brown held on February 21, 
2008 in Brussels, in reaction to remarks by 
reporters that the Ban ki-Moon did not 
allow the deployment of EULEX, Presi-
dent of the European Commission Jose 
Manuel Barroso denied that this was true 
saying that the UN Secretary General “of-
ficially did not oppose the sending of the 
EU mission” 71. 
To achieve the goal of a labour-sharing 
between the two field missions in Kosovo, 
it has been speculated that the UN Secre-
tary General might respond to the pres-
sure from Russia and launch new talks be-
tween Kosovo and Serbia and, in the 
meanwhile, prolong the transition period 




70 The Secretary’s General closing remarks at the 
UNSC meeting on Kosovo of February 18, 2008 are 
available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid 
=3011. Italics added.  
71 See EC Chiefs defends mission, available at 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy 
=2008&mm=02&dd=23&nav_id=47920. 
72 H. BONE-M. HALPIN, Envoys fear UN chief Ban 
Ki Moon may go soft on Kosovo, in The Times, April 
11, 2008.  
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It is quite evident that the UN Secre-
tary General is, in any case, the key player, 
as, according to Resolution 1244, he is the 
only actor entitled, to establish “an inter-
national civilian presence in Kosovo" with 
the assistance of relevant international or-
ganizations. 
The second scenario, replacement, would 
come into play if the UNSC adopted a 
resolution deciding the formal closure of 
UNMIK and its replacement by the EULEX 
Kosovo Mission. It is obvious that such a 
resolution would contribute to radically 
eliminating any ambiguity in the institu-
tional architecture of the international 
presence in Kosovo and also would offer a 
solid legal basis for the deployment of 
EULEX Kosovo in the field. 
According to one line of thinking, 
EULEX Kosovo will replace UNMIK on 
June 15, 2008, when the new Constitution 
will come into force. This thesis has been 
defended, for example, by Peter Feith, the 
EU Special Representative and most pro-
bably head of the future International Ci-
vilian Office. He declared on Radio Free 
Europe on April 7, 2008, “As far as I am 
concerned, yes, it [UNMIK] ends then 
[on June 15]” 73. 
This theory is mainly based on the con-
tent of the new Kosovar Constitution, ex-
pected to enter into force on June 15, 
which in articles 146 and 147 explicitly 
makes reference to this new figure, the In-
ternational Civilian Representative, which, 
as we mentioned earlier, was first seen in 
the Ahtisaari Plan. This new institution is 
clearly meant to substitute UNMIK’s ex-
isting mandate and role. This seems, as 
well, the line of reasoning of Kosovo: in 
his speech at a private meeting of the UN 
Security Council on Kosovo of April 21, 
2008, the Kosovar’s President Thaci de-
clared that 
 
Our relationship with the the UN … will 
change now that the reality on the ground has 
changed. The Government of Kosovo looks 
 
 
73 Balkan Insight, April 8, 2008, available at http: 
//www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/9315/.  
forward to working with the UN as it adapts to 
the new circumstances. 
 
Nevertheless, to fully apply this substi-
tution, it must be reiterated that a new 
UNSC Resolution will be needed, some-
thing which, at this moment, seems quite 
unlikely. In this regard, paragraph 19 of 
UNSC Resolution 1244 provides a sound 
legal basis, stating that: 
 
the international civil and security presences 
are established for an initial period of 12 
months, to continue thereafter unless the Secu-
rity Council decides otherwise. 
 
This also seems to be the UN Secretary 
General’s line of reasoning. He explicitly 
mentioned in a statement on Kosovo on 
February 17, 2008: 
 
Pending guidance from the Security Council, 
UNMIK will continue to consider Security 
Council resolution 1244 (1999) as the legal 
framework for its mandate and will continue to 
implement its mandate in the light of the 
evolving circumstances 74. 
 
A third scenario, geographical speciali-
zation, could be that, de facto or de jure, 
UNMIK and EULEX will operate in dif-
ferent settings: the EULEX Kosovo Mis-
sion working in the southern part of Kos-
ovo, mainly inhabited by Albanian Kos-
ovars and UNMIK in the north, mainly 
inhabited by Serbian Kosovars. Some in-
dications that this could really be a possi-
ble scenario are based on recent discus-
sions between UNMIK and the Serbian 
authorities aimed at allowing the Serbian 
authorities to hold Serbian parliamentary 
elections, scheduled to take place on May 
11, 2008, in Kosovo. This has been inter-
preted as a Serbian “diplomatic” attempt 
to divide the newly independent Kosovo 
along ethnic lines 75. Another element that 
 
 
74 The statement of the UN SG of February 17 is 
available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid 
=3008. 
75 D. BILEFSKY, Serbia Formally Proposes Ethnic 
Partition of Kosovo, in The New York Times, March 25, 
2008.  
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can be used to argue that this scenario is a 
realistic one is the fact that due to security 
reasons following the unilateral declara-
tion of independence, Peter Feith, the 
EUSR confirmed on February 23, 2008, 
temporarily withdrew EU mission person-
nel from the northern part of Kosovo 76. 
Finally, there is a fourth scenario, com-
petition, which in my opinion, would be 
the worst. UNMIK and EULEX will con-
tinue to work in Kosovo as if nothing has 
happened in an atmosphere of competi-
tion and reciprocal mistrust. This could 
have very negative consequences for the 
consolidation of the situation in Kosovo 
and for the credibility of the role of the 
international community and its institu-
tions, both at the UN and at the EU level. 
To a certain extent, the EU decision to 
end the operations of the EU Pillar in 
UNMIK by June 30, 2008could be inter-
preted as a sign of the opening of institu-
tional hostilities, although this would, most 
probably, not be the correct interpreta-
tion. In fact, the argument used by Paul 
Acda, head of the EU Pillar, does not help 
in avoiding misunderstandings which, at 
this moment, could be extremely danger-
ous: 
 
The European Commission is currently fund-
ing and will continue to fund two other mis-
sions, EULEX and ICO, so it felt it contrib-
uted as much as it could to UNMIK 77. 
 
This scenario could have very negative 
consequences including, for example, a 
“Mostarisation” of Kosovo. In other words, 
the international presence, and especially 
 
 
76 See EULEX withdraws from North, available at 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy 
=2008&mm=02&dd=23&nav_id=47920. 
77 The press release is available at www.euinkosovo. 
org. In his statement to a private meeting of the UN 
Security Council on April 21, 2008, the UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary General for Kosovo, 
declared that this decision of the EU “will have a 
significant operational impact upon UNMIK’S ability 
to administer key areas of Kosovo’s economy, as the 
mission, as currently budgeted, does not have the 
capacity, at this stage, to fill the gap”.  
UNMIK, becomes so open-ended that it 
becomes impossible to leave and instead 
of healing, cements the partition. 
The Kosovo case, which from the be-
ginning has been a very complex and slip-
pery topic for everyone involved in it, con-
tinues to be a very delicate and sensitive 
issue which, if not dealt with properly and 
in a timely fashion, could have severe nega-
tive consequences, not only for the stabil-
ity of the region, but for the future of rela-
tions between the European Union, its 
major neighbours and the United Nations 
as well. Just consider, for example, the is-
sue of Kosovo’s representation in interna-
tional fora. 
In such circumstances, I humbly sug-
gest that it would be strongly advisable for 
everybody involved in the issue to fully 
adhere to the existing rules and, at the 
same time, also be flexible enough to find 
practicable solutions which do not con-
tradict well established rules of interna-
tional law that, especially in time of ten-
sion, represent a common reference point. 
This basic concept, which is shared in 
many recent EU documents 78, must also 
be reflected in the daily behaviour of all 
those working in the field and at head-
quarters responsible for the Kosovo dos-
sier. This idea seems to be in line with the 
opinion of UN Secretary General, who, 
during the meeting of the UNSC devoted 
to the Kosovo situation stated that all 
should be fully aware of the urgent need: 
 
to act in an effective, realistic and concrete 
manner. In doing so, pending Security Council 
guidance, I might have to adjust to develop-
ments and changes on the ground. My efforts 
– and those of my Special Representative in 
Kosovo – are aimed at ensuring that the politi-
cal and security situation in Kosovo and in the 
wider region remains stable, and that the po-
 
 
78 For example, in the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council of February 28, 2008, in which a 
Conclusion on Kosovo has been adopted, the Council 
reiterates “… the EU’S adherence to the principles of 
the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, inter alia, 
the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity 
and all UN Security Council Resolutions”. Italics added.  
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pulation of Kosovo, and in particular, the mi-
nority communities are protected 79. 
 
The SRSG for Kosovo at a private 
meeting of the UN Security Council of 
April 21, 2008, delivered a very similar 
statement in which he confirmed that 
 
The UNMIK Mission will continue to dis-
charge the mandate given to it by this Council 
under SCR 1244 according to the guidance 
received from the Secretary-General. But we 
must acknowledge that the environment is 
changing around us, and our performance of 
this mandate today does not mean the same as 
it did in 1999, when there were no Kosovo in-
stitutions and UNMIK intervention was neces-
sary in all sectors to prevent a total absence of  
 
 
79 The statement of the UN Secretary General at 
the Security Council is available at http://www.un.org/ 
apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=3010.  
government and public order. That is evidently 
not the situation today. 
 
The fact that EULEX Kosovo has been 
launched but not yet officially deployed 
offers valuable space for negotiation. In 
this framework the role to be played by 
the UN Secretary General will be of piv-
otal importance. In the name and interest 
of the local population which has suffered 
enough from the terrible consequences of 
war and instability, it must be hoped that 
his involvement meet the expectations of 
those institutions and communities who 
are seeking to find a durable, sustainable 
and just solution to the endless problems 




Abstract: L’Unione Europea ha investito nel Kosovo molte risorse ed un notevole impegno politico. La 
recente decisione del Consiglio dell’Unione europea di dispiegare la missione EULEX Kosovo rappresenta 
un ulteriore passo della strategia europea nella difficile area balcanica. In questo contributo si esaminano i 
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